

Non-party (formed by presidents) governments: design, appointment and peculiarities of operationalization in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe

The article is dedicated to outlining the design, appointment and the reasons for the formation and operationalization of non-party governments in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe. It was argued that non-party governments in the president-parliamentary countries of Eastern Europe are the governments that are formed and run by the presidents according to their purpose and logic. They both determine the presidentialization and autocratization of political systems and regimes and depend on these factors. It was revealed that non-party governments under the conditions of president-parliamentarism are not technocratic, although different political actors usually defined them as such ones. Instead, non-party governments under president-parliamentarism are pseudo-technocratic, as they cause deformation of the logic of technocratic governance.

Keywords: non-party government, technocracy, pseudo-technocracy, president, presidentialisation, semi-presidentialism, president-parliamentarism, authoritarianism, autocracy, Eastern Europe.

НЕПАРТІЙНІ (СФОРМОВАНІ ПРЕЗИДЕНТАМИ) УРЯДИ: КОНСТРУКЦІЇ, ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ОПЕРАЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ В ПРЕЗИДЕНТ-ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ КРАЇНАХ СХІДНОЇ ЄВРОПИ

У статті було окреслено конструкції, призначення та особливості і причини формування й існування непартійних урядів у президентсько-парламентських країнах Східної Європи. Аргументовано, що непартійні уряди в президентсько-парламентських країнах Східної Європи за своїм призначенням і логікою функціонування є урядами, які сформовані й керовані президентами. Вони як зумовляють президенціалізацію й автократизацію політичних систем і режимів, так і залежні від цих чинників. Виявлено, що непартійні уряди в умовах президент-парламентаризму не є технократичними, хоча й політичними акторами зазвичай окреслюються саме такими. Натомість непартійні уряди в умовах президент-парламентаризму є псевдотехнократичними, оскільки зумовляють деформацію логіку технократичного урядування.

Ключові слова: непартійний уряд, технократизм, псевдотехнократизм, президент, президенціалізація, напівпрезиденталізм, президент-парламентаризм, авторитаризм, автократія, Східна Європа.

Political practice in Eastern European countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), which at the time of the research were exclusively semi-presidential (in particular, to presidential-parliamentary belong Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia; to parliamentary-presidential – Armenia, Georgia (amendment to the constitution were introduced for the country to become a parliamentary one), Moldova and Ukraine) systems of government, proves that both party and non-party governments/governmental cabinets are formed there. A characteristic feature is that the former mainly prevails in the systems of parliamentary-presidential republics, the latter within the systems of presidential-parliamentary republics (to which, apart from the abovementioned countries, historically belonged all Eastern European countries, except Moldova). It puts on the agenda the issues, how different types of governments in the semi-presidential systems correlate with consolidation of power in the hands of presidents or prime-ministers. However, the emphasis is on various constructions and peculiarities of operationalization of non-party governments, which expectedly and hypothetically especially under conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism, form the extension of the vertical power structure of the heads/presidents, and thus do not position themselves as independent institutes of executive power.

These, as well as other attributes of non-party organizations can be observed in the works by such scientists as O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels and K. Strom¹, L. Graham², O. Kryshchanovskaya³, A. Lijphart⁴, J. Linz⁵, M. Mommsen⁶, E. Morgan-Jones and P. Schleiter⁷,

¹ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, "Comparative Political Studies" 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.; O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective*, "Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies" 2010, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 10–23.; O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies* // Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002, 33 s.

² L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 212–228.

³ O. Kryshchanovskaya, *Anatomie der russischen Elite. Die Militarisierung Russlands unter Putin*, Wyd. Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2005.

⁴ A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 90–115.

⁵ J. Linz, *Introduction: Some Thoughts on Presidentialism in Postcommunist Europe*, [w:] R. Taras (ed.), *Postcommunist Presidents*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1997, s. 1–10.

⁶ M. Mommsen, *Sarkows: Souveräne Demokratie: Formel für einen russischen Sonderweg?*, „Russland Analysen“ 2006, vol 114, nr. 6, s. 2–4;

M. Mommsen, *Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Krenl und die Schatten der Macht*, Wyd. Verlag C. H. Beck 2004.

⁷ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, "Post-Soviet Affairs" 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

N. Parison⁸, G. Peters⁹, O. Protsyk¹⁰, J. Staun¹¹, A. Sundakov¹², L. Shevtsova¹³ and others. However, current research do not provide a unified answer to a range of theoretical-methodological questions, including: 1) what non-party governments are and how they correspond with the governments formed by experts (technocratic governments); 2) what is the essence of non-party and technocratic mechanisms of government formation; 3) whether non-party governments are obligatory grounded on the ideas of technocracy and technocratism; 4) why in some systems of inter-institutional relations we may usually come across party governments, whereas in other systems prevail non-party governments etc.; 5) why some non-party governments are less stable and effective than other non-party governments etc. Thus, a very important place belongs to the problems of correlation between different constructions of non-party governments and various institutional mechanisms of political systems functioning (first of all presidential-parliamentarism), including the countries of Eastern Europe.

Grounding on the position that the idea of non-party nature and technocratism is not a new one, we note that it is operationalized quite variably: in one case aiming at logics of effective managerial decisions implementation¹⁴; in other focusing on enhancing powers of other political actors, first of all heads of states, however in “disguise” of the idea of implementation of effective managerial decisions. In any case the idea of non-party nature of governance is closely connected with politics, as by means of non-party (including technocratic ones) governments the center of power (in particular the institute of the head of the state) can exert influence on the process of adoption and implementation of managerial and political decisions, which are of benefit to it.

It is particularly noticeable in semi-presidential countries of Eastern Europe, first of all in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia. Though earlier it was peculiar of all countries in the region, except Moldova (mostly of Georgia and Armenia till the end of the 90s of the 20th century-early 21st century, and also of Ukraine during different periods of its political development). The point is that in these countries (which were or still are presidential-parliamentary republics)

⁸ N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, ECSP, The World Bank: Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000, 12 s.

⁹ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339–358.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who's Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 232–254.

¹⁰ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemeč (eds.), *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NIS-Pačee 2006, s. 15–26.; O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2003, vol 25, nr. 4, s. 427–442.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

¹¹ J. Staun, *Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy*, „DIIS Report” 2007, vol 9, 69 s.

¹² A. Sundakov, *The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine*, [w:] P. Cornelius, P. Lenain (eds.), *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market: Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 1997, s. 275–288.

¹³ L. Shevtsova, *Russland im Jahr 2006. Die Elite stellt sich auf für den Kampf um die Sicherung ihrer Machtpositionen*, „Russlandanalysen” 2006, vol 122, nr. 6, s. 2–4.

¹⁴ G. Peters, *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, “Comparative Politics” 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339–358.

non-party governments serve as an instrument for strengthening powers and authority of the elected presidents, and thus considerably contributed to autocratization of political regimes. On the other hand, it is presupposed by the fact that in the abovementioned countries formation of non-party governments quite often is a derivative of the constitutional attributes of presidential-parliamentarism (in particular traditionally or mainly non-parliamentary way of government formation), current political regimes (as it was observed, that non-party governments are more often formed in authoritarian and hybrid regimes), political and cultural traditions, peculiarities of party-electoral systems and so on, which are generally reduced to the special roles of heads of countries not only in the process of government formation and responsibility, but in overall political process. Therefore, it is absolutely obvious that non-party governments in most Eastern European countries are or were cabinets, formed (managed) by presidents.

That is why, formation of non-party governments in the majority of Eastern European countries is predetermined by the fact that this type of governments let informally enhance already powerful enough presidential powers and authority – first of all within the political systems, determined as semi-presidential of presidential-parliamentary type (and in due time in the presidential systems). The point is that forming non-party governments, presidents receive additional influence on determination of political process – this is done on the basis of direct/indirect impact on election (choice and selection) of governmental ministers. Thus, it means that domination of non-party ministers is justified in case when the head of the state wishes to preserve their assigned authority. Besides, it has positive effect on hypothetical nature of current presidents' reelection, limiting by this the chances of prime-ministers or other acting political figures to become presidents. This promotes informal autocratization of a political regime. That is why, scientists often combine non-party (formed by presidents) governments with existence of authoritarian and hybrid political regimes¹⁵.

Especially this attribute of assignation/role of non-party governments is actualized in those authoritarian regimes, where a prime-minister has no chances to become a president after the elections (Azerbaijan, Belarus). Mitigation of such "personalization" (on the basis of non-party government formation by presidents) of the head of the state is peculiar of hybrid and some authoritarian regimes, where the prime-minister is a part of security ministries of the executive vertical (Russia, Ukraine over some periods). The point is that under such political regimes prime-ministers sometimes receive a stimulus to increase their political significance in the context of electoral advantages before the presidential elections. Drawing a conclusion it is necessary to mention that in most Eastern European countries (especially in those with authoritarian regimes) non-party governments serve an instrument for transformation the idea

¹⁵ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.

of representative democracy into “delegative or personal dictatorship”¹⁶. As there does not exist a “contract of delegation”, which is peculiar of representative democracy, formed on the basis of a systematic unification of political parties. However, violation of the formula of representativeness takes place not only in presidential republics (often it is justified and is regarded as a pattern of such systems), but also in semi-presidential, which theoretically may copy various models of government formation (including non-party ones) – parliamentary and presidential.

Thus, non-party governments in most Eastern European countries position themselves as presidential cabinets and first of all are peculiar of presidential systems (sometimes earlier) and presidential-parliamentary semi-presidential systems. Besides, it is empirically obvious that non-party government formation more often takes place in the systems of semi-presidential type (as well as under conditions of semi-presidentialism, which is constitutionally absent in the region), as the head of the state is nationally elected and has more influence on cabinet formation processes, than the president, elected within the frames of parliamentary procedures. Moreover, it is intuitively clear that the president’s influence on appointing non-party ministers is determined by electoral preferences and electoral power of political actors. Herewith, in general it is hypothetically correct to believe that the growth of number of non-party ministers and correspondingly non-party governments under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarism happens as a result of: prevalence of systems of the unified majority; growth in electoral variability; increase of a number of agents in the process of cabinet formation; complication of the procedure of obtaining parliamentary majority to support one or another cabinet; growth in factional typology of the parliament; social-economic crisis, which is determined by low indices of social-economic development; dominance of elements of authoritarian and hybrid political regime, for which non-party character of ministers is a stimulus for the growth of presidents’ authorities; increase in presidents’ legislative powers¹⁷. Additional reasons which contribute to formation and “explanation” of non-party nature of governments in Eastern European countries are or previously were such factors as: excessive segmentation of the society (Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan); wish to satisfy interests of clans (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia); providing support to the regime (especially authoritarian – Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan); idea of enhancing government’s effectiveness (Georgia and Russia); providing neutralizing position in the system of divided minority, when none of political actors possess distinctive influence on the political process (Russia, Ukraine and Armenia); factional character of party systems (Belarus, earlier Russia, Ukraine); presidential character of political systems (all countries in the region, except Moldova); peculiarities of electoral systems (especially majority or mixed parallel systems – Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, earlier Russia and Ukraine); formal and

¹⁶ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2010.; K. Strom, W. Müller, T. Bergman, *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

¹⁷ O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies* // Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“, Aalborg, Denmark, August 15-17, 2002, 33 s.

factual “weakness” of prime-ministers (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus); weakness of governments’ collective responsibility to parliaments (all countries, except Moldova and Armenia). Growth in number of non-party ministers under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism also depends on such determinants as: increase in factional nature of party systems¹⁸; reduction of professional character of bureaucracy¹⁹; worsening (and negative character) of economic situation in the country²⁰; lowering of the democracy level in the country or development of the country in an autocratic direction (by weakening the development of party system). In this regard, O. Protsyk associates non-party government formation in Eastern Europe first of all with the fact that in the countries, where it is actualized, are functioning rather weakly developed party systems, which are characterized by a low level of party mobilization²¹. Thus, non-party governments in the region during the process of their initialization and formation are usually determined by a primary perspective, aimed at exclusion of any (or all) party-ideological components, as the ability to solve effectively tasks set before the government is predominantly determined on the basis of its non-party composition.

The most interesting thing is that non-party (formed by presidents) governments in most Eastern European countries are positioned by their “creators” as technocratic, i.e. those composed of ministers-professionals. But in fact such non-party (“pseudo-technocratic”) governments if do not originate a range of problems concerning their efficiency then may do it. Most of all it is represented from those perspectives of decision-making by non-party cabinets as: changeability of the state and governmental policy²²; fragmentation of the decision-making processes in hybrid regimes and unilateralism in authoritarian regimes²³; restriction of ministers’ interests²⁴. Thus, specific orientation of some ministers prevents deriving collective state policy of non-party governments. That is why, common for all Eastern European countries conclusion

¹⁸ O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.; P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones, *Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared*, “European Journal of Political Research” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

¹⁹ L. Graham, *Transients and Careerists in Latin America*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 212–228.; G. Peters, *Bureaucrats and Political Appointees in European Democracies: Who’s Who and Does It Make Any Difference?*, [w:] A. Farazmand (ed.), *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1997, s. 232–254.

²⁰ O. Amorim Neto, D. Samuels, *Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective*, “Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies” 2010, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 10–23.

²¹ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.; O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAce Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007, 9 s.

²² O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in Ukraine: The Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority*, [w:] A. Rosenbaum, J. Nemec (eds.), *Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*, Wyd. NISPAce 2006, s. 15–26.

²³ E. Morgan-Jones, P. Schleiter, *Governmental Change in a President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003*, “Post-Soviet Affairs” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.; N. Parison, *Russia: Public Administration Reform in Russia: Issues and Options*, ECSPE, The World Bank: Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7, 2000, 12 s.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.; A. Sundakov, *The Machinery of Government and Economic Policy in Ukraine*, [w:] P. Cornelius, P. Lenain (eds.), *Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market: Proceedings of an IMF/World Bank Seminar*, Wyd. International Monetary Fund 1997, s. 275–288.; K. Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation*, Wyd. CEU Press 2001.

²⁴ O. Protsyk, *Institutionalizing Cabinet Government in the Western CIS Countries*, Paper Prepared at NISPAce Conference, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 16-18, 2007, 9 s.

shows that non-party (formed by presidents) governments are marked by “emergence” of weakness of party-electoral systems and absence of institutional stimuli to consolidate the latter²⁵. On the other hand, party systems in the countries, where one may find non-party governments, are client-oriented and cartelized, as a result of what parties are especially “vulnerable” depending on pressure of governance and meeting the requirements of different groups of interests.

The most vivid example is Russia and the process of government formation under the influence of non-party ministers, which are traditionally but very conventionally called “technocrats”. Relativeness is explained by the fact the political regime in this country is in fact constructed not on the president’s position as the head of the state, but on the president’s position being a strong politician. Besides, governance in Russia is executed by those categories of officials known as “security officials” (and partially, especially before) by “liberal technocrats”. However, the latter are characterized by a distorted significance, as bureaucrats in Russia are “powerful”, being directly and strongly connected with Russian business and powerful-executive vertical. In this situation, the president is positioned as a “mediator”. Moreover, the president is traditionally regarded as a “security broker”, as namely he prevents direct opposition between various groups of political elites. Their mutual relation is in constant shift and enhancement of authoritarian nature of the head of the state (president), who adjusts relations between different elements (in fact at different times) of non-party governments, in particular between the so-called “family” (representatives of Yeltsin regime, who were the first to get political and authoritative priorities), the so-called “Saint-Petersburg” group (V. Putin’s friends of the time when he lived in the city) and “heads of security ministers”²⁶ or in other words, between “politicians”, “security officials”, “bureaucrats”, “big business”²⁷. Thus, the main idea of non-party nature of governments (and non-party policy in general) in Russia lies in the fact, that the country must be ruled (governed) by the so-called “consolidated vertical” – powerful and centralized executive branch, headed by the president²⁸.

That is why the main peculiarity of non-party governments in presidential-parliamentarian countries in Eastern countries is their subordination and responsibility. In the countries with weak party systems and where non-party governments are formed only under client-oriented conditions (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, and in due time Georgia), namely president possesses great powers and authority. In these countries party-electoral parameters of cabinets’ responsibility have the least significance. Therefore, non-party governments are subordinated and

²⁵ H. Kitschelt, *The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, nr. 4, s. 447–472.; O. Protsyk, *Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine*, “Europa-Asia Studies” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

²⁶ O. Kryshchanovskaya, *Anatomie der russischen Elite. Die Militarisierung Russlands unter Putin*, Wyd. Kiepenheuer & Witsch 2005, s. 149; M. Mommsen, *Sarkous: Souveräne Demokratie: Formel für einen russischen Sonderweg?*, „Russland Analysen” 2006, vol 114, nr. 6, s. 2–4.; M. Mommsen, *Wer herrscht in Russland? Der Kreml und die Schatten der Macht*, Wyd. Verlag C. H. Beck 2004.

²⁷ L. Shevtsova, *Russland im Jahr 2006. Die Elite stellt sich auf für den Kampf um die Sicherung ihrer Machtpositionen*, „Russlandanalysen” 2006, vol 122, nr. 6, s. 2–4.

²⁸ J. Staun, *Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and its Foreign Policy*, „DIIS Report” 2007, vol 9, 69 s.

liable only to the heads of states, though formally they are responsible to both²⁹. Consequently, non-party governments under the conditions of Eastern-European presidential-parliamentarianism are positioned as those which directly oppose the idea of a “governmental cabinet” (more precisely, the idea of “cabinet governance”). The essence of the latter is in the fact that formation of political-governmental area, where the prime-minister is predominantly “first among the equals” and cabinets’ meetings form an arena, where all important governmental decisions are taken with contributions from all ministers. The point is that non-party nature of the cabinet is regarded as the biggest challenge to the collective nature of the government. Due to this, non-party cabinets in East European countries face a great number of obstacles while working out a consolidated governmental decision. However, prime-ministers in non-party governments are positioned as “executive managers” in the processes of implementing presidential initiatives³⁰, and thus considerably strengthen the latter in the political process and political system. It is supplemented by the fact that under conditions of presidential-parliamentarian system the role of ministers in case of non-party governments is in fact defined by presidential position and strategy³¹. It is specifically correct in the case of a presidential system of government, when the president is regarded as a leading actor in the process of governmental decision making processes and resignation, while the parliament plays a role of a supporting actor in this process (what is inherent to almost all or the majority of presidential-parliamentarian systems in Eastern Europe, where the president is supported by a pro-presidential party, possessing majority in legislature). Therefore, we argue that non-party governments are immanently peculiar of presidential-parliamentarianism, but their formation is additionally presupposed by the result of client-structured party systems existence. Besides, main factors of non-party governments in Eastern Europe are relations of submission and intraparty weakness. While absence of ideological liabilities or of obligatory party principles of activity make institutional loyalty especially dependable on sanctions or rules, outlined in constitutions. It means that in presidential-parliamentary systems non-party governments formed and managed by presidents are sometimes even more presidential, than in case of presidentialism. Consequently, namely non-party governments make these systems, characterized by powerful presidents, even more presidentialized.

In general it signifies that political systems which are not typified by promotion of institutionalization of political regimes on the basis of political parties would rather be characterized by formation of non-party cabinets or party-cabinets with a large number of non-party ministers. Even despite the logics they apply: a) either the logics of one-party majority systems

²⁹ O. Protsyk, *Cabinet Decision-Making in the Western CIS countries: Dual Executive and The Diffusion of Policy-Making Authority in Ukraine*, Wyd. Practice 2005.

³⁰ O. Protsyk, *Domestic political institutions in Ukraine and Russia and their responses to EU enlargement*, “Communist and Post-Communist Studies” 2003, vol 25, nr. 4, s. 427–442.

³¹ O. Amorim Neto, K. Ström, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; O. Amorim Neto, *The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2006, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 415–440.

– and this is a traditional variant for authoritarian or hybrid regimes (or systems of competitive autocracy), which seek support of pro-presidential parties (Azerbaijan, Russia), or of non-party agents to provide support for the government in the parliament (Belarus); b) or the logics of a divided majority or minority – what is a traditional variant for hybrid political regimes (till 1999 in Armenia, till 2006 in Ukraine, till 2003 in Russia and so on). Besides, in presidential-parliamentarian semi-presidential systems non-party governments provide rather specific articulation of political interests, as especially in the case, when inter-institutional relations resemble those under the conditions of presidentialism, articulation of political interests by governments becomes almost invisible and impossible, as in such systems governments in the process of their survival absolutely depend on the position of the head of the state. It is mostly notable due to impossibility (formal or/and factual) of cohabitation within the system of presidential-parliamentarianism. As from the formal side, in case of direct opposition between the president and cabinet, the former has a right to resign the latter. On the other hand, in fact non-party government in opposition with the head of the state does not possess any articulated and consolidated support in the parliament, which is a base for cohabitation. In this case, there is special sense in the conclusion concerning combination of the role of non-party governments and authoritarian/hybrid political regimes.

In conclusion we argue that under the conditions of presidential-parliamentarianism, as well as due to the soviet heritage “technocracism” and autocratic regimes may coexist, enhancing each other as phenomena of political management. At the same time, technocratic governance is regarded as a way of non-ideological and autocracy is positioned as one of the types of political regime. However, the difference is that the so-called “technocrats” in Eastern European countries usually have nothing to do with the heritage of economics or political science in western world. On the contrary, logics of non-party governance in the region of Eastern Europe can rather be called “pseudo-technocracism”. It is presupposed by the fact that historically the notion of technocracy has been used in the analyzed countries as a sign of non-party affiliation. It resulted in the question of preservation of political regimes and exclusion of elements of ideological opposition.

Thus, of great importance for Eastern European countries is the aspect that the so-called “technocratic” ministers and “technocratic” cabinets are usually regarded as conventional, as sometimes “technocrats” must be determined a bit wider, as in Belarus, where one observes formation of non-party cabinets, but the leading role belongs to non-party parliaments; sometimes, the so-called “technocrats” are members of parties, and thus in their activity they often actualize both their party’s program and their non-party roles (most notably it is in Ukraine, Armenia and Russia). That is why there is sense to distinguish two types of “technocrats” and non-party officials, who belong to non-party governments in Eastern Europe – apolitical and political. Such theorization clearly proves the fact that technocratic nature of non-party phenomenon in the region and its effects should be treated separately. In one case, it is positioned as an instrument

and way to preserve integrity of a political system (but not in non-personified direction). In another case implementation of non-party cabinet's course of action mainly becomes the ground for further staying in power, as well as the means to strengthen the positions of formal/informal head of the government – president. Thus, (at least statistically) non-party governments are mainly “distorted”/modified in authoritarian systems and are defective in hybrid regimes. In general, it proves that the countries of Eastern Europe (first of all presidential-parliamentarian republics – current and historical) distorted the initial idea of technocracy in favor of their government institutions survival. As a result of this, the system of scientific values was not created, but took place a simple substitution of notions. Besides, in the practices of all analyzed countries of Eastern Europe the rules of gaining powers and authorities have been violated, as power is predominantly achieved by means of political delegation, transfer of authority and rights, which in fact do not guarantee effectiveness of governance, but only stability of power.

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